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Aboriginal Title in Canada: Site-Specific or Territorial?
Professor Kent McNeil*
Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto
Presented at the Law on the Edge Conference, Canadian Law and Society
Association/Law and Society Association of Australia and New Zealand,
University of British Columbia, Vancouver, July 1-4, 2013
This paper addresses the issue of Aboriginal title to land, and the relationship I
see between Indigenous law and the common law in this context. In my
understanding, there have been three judicial approaches to Aboriginal title:
1. A purely proprietary approach, based on occupation of land and the effect
given to occupation by the common law (common law Aboriginal title).
2. An Indigenous law approach, whereby Aboriginal title arises from and is
defined by pre-existing Indigenous law (Indigenous law title).
3. A territorial approach, whereby Aboriginal title is derived from both common
law and Indigenous law and has governmental dimensions (territorial Aboriginal
title).1
I am going to describe each of these, and then offer some critical comments on
the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard2 and
the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s more recent decision in William v.
British Columbia (the Tsilhqot'in Nation case).3
1. Common Law Aboriginal Title
It is an obvious historical fact that Indigenous peoples were living in North
America, and occupying and using land in accordance with their own ways of
*

In addition to the very helpful feedback received from fellow panelists and the other
participants at the Law on the Edge Conference, I would like to thank Kerry Wilkins for his
very useful comments.
1
Brian Slattery, in “The Metamorphosis of Aboriginal Title” (2006) 85 Can. Bar Rev. 255
[Slattery, “Metamorphosis”], has identified three similar conceptions of Aboriginal title.
However, he describes the third, which he supports, as “a sui generis right grounded in
ancient relations between the Crown and Indigenous peoples”: ibid. at 263, elaborated on at
269-79.
2
[2005] 2 S.C.R. 220 [Marshall/Bernard].
3
[2012] 3 C.N.L.R. 333 [Tsilhqot’in Nation BCCA].
1

life, when the Europeans arrived and began to colonize the continent. In the
settled parts of Canada first colonized by the British, the settlers brought the
common law with them.4
Under the common law, people who are in occupation of land are presumed to
have possession and thus title to the land they occupy. 5 So Indigenous peoples
would have title under the common law to the lands they occupied at the time of
the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty.6 This common law Aboriginal title neither
depends on, nor is defined by, Indigenous law. It is a wholly common law
concept. Moreover, it is purely proprietary – it does not necessarily entail
governmental authority or political jurisdiction.
I would characterize the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to Aboriginal title
in Marshall/Bernard and the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s approach in
the Tsilhqot’in Nation case as a proprietary, common law approach. I will come
back to those decisions later.
2. Indigenous Law Title
In addition to occupying and using land, the Indigenous peoples of Canada had
their own legal orders at the time of European colonization.7 These legal orders
included laws in relation to land.8
4

Connolly v. Woolrich (1867), 17 R.J.R.Q. 75 (Que. S.C.), aff’d sub nom. Johnstone v.
Connolly (1969), 17 R.J.R.Q. 266 (Que. Q.B.).
5
Calder v. British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313 per Hall J. (dissenting on other grounds) at
368, 375 [Calder].
6
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 at paras. 114, 149, per Lamer C.J.
[Delgamuukw]; Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1989), esp. at 196-221 [McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title]. Crown assertion of
sovereignty also raises issues of legality and legitimacy that I have addressed elsewhere: see
Kent McNeil, “Negotiated Sovereignty: Indian Treaties and the Acquisition of American and
Canadian Territorial Rights in the Pacific Northwest”, in Alexandra Harmon, ed., The Power
of Promises: Rethinking Indian Treaties in the Pacific Northwest (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 2008), 35, and “Indigenous Nations and the Legal Relativity of European
Claims to Territorial Sovereignty in North America”, in Sandra Tomsons and Lorraine
Mayer, eds., Philosophy and Aboriginal Rights: Critical Dialogues (Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 2013), 242.
7
See John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2010).
8
E.g. see Leroy Little Bear, “Aboriginal Rights and the Canadian ‘Grundnorm’”, in J. Rick
Ponting, ed., Arduous Journey: Canadian Indians and Decolonization (Toronto: McClelland
& Stewart, 1986), 243; Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Report of the
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, vol. 2, Restructuring the Relationship (Ottawa:
2

At the time of the British Crown’s assertion of sovereignty, those laws and the
land rights of the Indigenous peoples under those laws would have continued by
virtue of the doctrine of continuity.9 This doctrine has been applied in Canada to
the land rights of the French Canadians when Britain acquired New France from
the French king in 1763.10
The doctrine of continuity has also been adopted and applied in the context of
the land rights of the Indigenous peoples of Australia by the High Court, initially
in Mabo v. Queensland11 in 1992. As a result, in Australia the source of native
title (as Aboriginal title is called there) is the pre-existing laws and customs of
the Indigenous peoples. Moreover, native title in Australia also receives its
content and is defined by Indigenous laws and customs. 12 This sounds positive
for Indigenous Australians because their laws are acknowledged and given
effect. However, this approach has serious downsides.13
First of all, in order to have their land rights acknowledged by the Australian
legal system, Indigenous Australians have to do more than prove that they
occupied and used land at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty. In
addition, they also have to establish that they had laws or customs in relation to
the land that gave them legal rights at that time. As this involves proof of the
legal orders of non-literate societies over 200 years ago (in eastern Australia),
the problems of proof can be formidable.
Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1996), pt. 2, 434-64; Richard Overstall,
“Encountering the Spirit in the Land: ‘Property’ in a Kinship-Based Legal Order”, in John
McLaren, A.R. Buck, and Nancy E. Wright, eds., Despotic Dominion: Property Rights in
British Settler Societies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 22.
9
See Brian Slattery, The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples (Saskatoon: University
of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1979), 50-59; Mark D. Walters, “The ‘Golden Thread’
of Continuity: Aboriginal Customs at Common Law and Under the Constitution Act, 1982”
(1999) 44 McGill L.J. 711; Kent McNeil and David Yarrow, “Has Constitutional Recognition
of Aboriginal Rights Adversely Affected Their Definition?” (2007) 37 Supreme Court L.
Rev. (2nd) 177 at 203-11.
10
See Drulard v. Welsh (1906), 11 O.L.R. 647 (Ont. Div. Ct.), rev’d on other grounds (1907),
14 O.L.R. 54 (Ont. C.A.). Admittedly, New France is regarded as having been acquired by
Britain by conquest and cession rather than by settlement, but the High Court of Australia, in
the cases cited in the next two notes, has held that the doctrine of continuity applies in settled
territories as well. See also McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 6 at 179-92.
11
(1992), 175 CLR 1.
12
See Fejo v. Northern Territory (1998), 195 C.L.R. 96; Western Australia v. Ward (2002),
213 C.L.R. 1 [Ward]; Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v. Victoria (2002),
214 C.L.R. 422 [Yorta Yorta].
13
See Simon Young, The Trouble with Tradition: Native Title and Cultural Change (Sydney:
Federation Press, 2008).
3

Secondly, in Australia native title rights are limited to pre-existing rights. So if
at the time of Crown acquisition of sovereignty an Indigenous people did not
have laws or customs in relation to minerals, for example, they are not entitled to
mineral rights on their native title lands.14 The content of their land rights is thus
frozen in the past at a time when they lived as hunters and gatherers.
Thirdly, under Australian law the Indigenous peoples have no inherent right of
self-government. While some modification of their pre-existing land rights is
possible, they have no inherent jurisdiction to make new laws in relation to land
or anything else.15
Fourthly, the High Court has held that loss of connection with the land and
significant gaps in the practice of Indigenous laws and customs result in loss of
native title.16 This is so even if the loss of connection was caused by forcible
dispossession by the colonizers.17
So far, Indigenous law has not been applied by Canadian courts in the way it has
been in Australia. Justice McLachlin, as she then was, suggested in her dissent
in R. v. Van der Peet18 that it would be appropriate to base Aboriginal rights and
title at least in part on pre-existing Indigenous law,19 but her decision as Chief
Justice in Marshall/Bernard is anything but an Indigenous law approach.
3. Territorial Aboriginal Title
Under this approach, Indigenous land rights are not limited to property rights, as
they are under the first two approaches. Instead, Indigenous peoples have
governmental authority (i.e., political jurisdiction) over the territories occupied
by them at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty, in addition to rights to the
14

Ward, supra note 12.
Yorta Yorta, supra note 12.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.
18
[1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 at paras. 261-75 [Van der Peet].
19
See also Mitchell v. MNR, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911 [Mitchell], per McLachlin C.J., delivering
the main judgment (Binnie and Major JJ. concurred in result), at para. 10: “aboriginal
interests and customary laws were presumed to survive the assertion of sovereignty, and were
absorbed into the common law as rights, unless (1) they were incompatible with the Crown's
assertion of sovereignty, (2) they were surrendered voluntarily via the treaty process, or (3)
the government extinguished them…. Barring one of these exceptions, the practices, customs
and traditions that defined the various aboriginal societies as distinctive cultures continued as
part of the law of Canada: see Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R.
313, and Mabo v. Queensland (1992), 175 C.L.R. 1 at 57 (per Brennan J.), pp. 81-82 (per
Deane and Gaudron JJ.), and pp. 182-83 (per Toohey J.).”
15
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lands and resources within those territories.20 This is the approach that has been
taken in the United States ever since the celebrated Cherokee Nation cases
decided by Chief Justice Marshall in the 1830s.21
In numerous cases before the Indian Claims Commission that went up on review
to the Court of Claims, the issue was whether the land in question had been part
of the territory that the claimant Indian nation occupied and controlled for a long
time before it was wrongfully taken by the United States government. 22 If it had
been, then prior to the taking the Indian nation would have had both title to the
land and jurisdiction over it, as held by Marshall C.J. in the Cherokee cases.23
What about Canada? Although the territorial title approach was not explicitly
adopted in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia24 (the leading Aboriginal title case
in Canada), I think Chief Justice Lamer’s decision points undeniably in that
direction. He said that there are two potential sources of Aboriginal title: (1)
occupation of land and the legal effect given to occupation by the common law –
the common law Aboriginal title approach; and (2) Aboriginal systems of law –
the Indigenous law approach.25
But, as I read his judgment, he then combined the two into an approach based on
occupation that incorporates both physical occupation and occupation through
the application of Indigenous law:

20

See Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Rights in Canada: From Title to Land to Territorial
Sovereignty” (1998) 5 Tulsa J. of Comp. and Int’l L. 253, reprinted in Kent McNeil,
Emerging Justice? Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (Saskatoon:
University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 2001), 58 at 95-101 [McNeil, Emerging
Justice?].
21
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515 (1832).
22
E.g. see Sac and Fox Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma v. United States, 161 Ct. Cl. 189
(1963), cert. denied 375 U.S. 921 (1963); Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs
Reservation of Oregon v. United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 184 (1966); United States v. Seminole
Indians, 180 Ct. Cl. 375 (1967); Sac and Fox Tribe v. United States, 383 F. 2d 991 (1967, Ct.
Cl.), cert. denied 389 U.S. 900 (1967); Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v. United
States, 490 F. 2d 935 (1974, Ct. Cl.); United States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 513 F. 2d 1383
(1975, Ct. Cl.). For a very useful survey of relevant American case law, see Michael J.
Kaplan, “Proof and Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands” (2003) 41 A.L.R.
Fed. 425. See also Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, Nell Jessup Newton, ed. (New
Providence, NJ: LexisNexis, 2012), §15.04[2] [Cohen’s Handbook].
23
See Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 22, §15.04[2]. See also United States v. Santa Fe
Pacific Railroad, 314 U.S. 339 (1941).
24
Delgamuukw, supra note 6.
25
Ibid. at para. 114.
5

[T]he source of aboriginal title appears to be grounded both in the
common law and in the aboriginal perspective on land; the latter
includes, but is not limited to, their systems of law. It follows that
both should be taken into account in establishing the proof of
occupancy.26
Elaborating on Indigenous law as a means of proving occupation, Lamer
C.J. continued:
As a result, if, at the time of sovereignty, an aboriginal society had
laws in relation to land, those laws would be relevant to
establishing the occupation of lands which are the subject of a
claim for aboriginal title. Relevant laws might include, but are not
limited to, a land tenure system or laws governing land use.27
Other examples of relevant Indigenous laws are contained in this passage:
[T]he aboriginal group asserting the claim to aboriginal title may
have trespass laws which are proof of exclusive occupation, such
that the presence of trespassers does not count as evidence against
exclusivity. As well, aboriginal laws under which permission may
be granted to other aboriginal groups to use or reside even
temporarily on land would reinforce the finding of exclusive
occupation. Indeed, if that permission were the subject of treaties
between the aboriginal nations in question, those treaties would
also form part of the aboriginal perspective.28
Occupation through Indigenous law is a territorial approach: Indigenous peoples
were in occupation of their traditional territories because they had laws,
including laws in relation to land, that applied in those territories. To put it
another way, they were in occupation because they exercised governmental
authority over their territories, in part through the application of their own laws.
Lamer C.J. acknowledged this exercise of governmental authority not only by
recognizing their capacity to make their own laws, but also by concluding that
permission to use lands could be granted by treaty to other Aboriginal nations, as

26

Ibid. at para. 147.
Ibid. at para. 148.
28
Ibid. at para. 157.
27

6

treaty-making authority is one of the attributes of independent, self-governing
nations.29
International law relies on the same criteria for acquiring title to territory (also
known as territorial sovereignty), namely, physical occupation and exercise of
governmental authority.30 International law therefore recognizes that the
exercise of governmental authority over land is necessarily territorial. In
domestic contexts, this exercise of authority by Indigenous peoples supports
continuing self-government power, whether regarded as residual sovereignty of
the Indian nations, as in the United States,31 or as an inherent right of selfgovernment of First Nations, as held by Justice Williamson of the British
Columbia Supreme Court in Campbell v. British Columbia.32
So by acknowledging Indigenous law as a source of Aboriginal title and as a
basis for proving occupation of land, Chief Justice Lamer’s approach to
Aboriginal title in Delgamuukw was necessarily territorial. His conception of
Aboriginal title therefore entailed both property rights and political authority. 33
4. Regressing to Common Law Aboriginal Title in Canada
Surprisingly, in Marshall/Bernard Chief Justice McLachlin ignored the
Indigenous law aspects, and hence the territorial dimensions, of Lamer C.J.’s
decision in Delgamuukw. She focused instead on physical occupation, and
seems to have confined the role of Aboriginal perspectives to Aboriginal
29

See James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th ed. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012), 369-71; Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 6th ed.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 198, 902-4.
30
Island of Palmas Case, (1928) 2 R.I.A.A. 829; Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case,
(1933) 2 P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 43; Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, 1953 I.C.J.R. 47. See
Crawford, supra note 29 at 221-26; Shaw, supra note 29 at 502-7.
31
See Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 22, §4.01.
32
[2000] 4 C.N.L.R. 1 [Campbell]. For more detailed discussion, see Kent McNeil, “Judicial
Approaches to Self-Government since Calder: Searching for Doctrinal Coherence”, in Hamar
Foster, Heather Raven, and Jeremy Webber, eds., Let Right Be Done: Aboriginal Title, the
Calder Case, and the Future of Indigenous Rights (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 129
[McNeil, “Judicial Approaches”].
33
See Campbell, supra note 32, esp. at paras. 134-38, where Williamson J. also relied on the
fact that Lamer C.J. had held that Aboriginal title is communal and that Aboriginal nations
have decision-making authority over their communally-held lands – authority that
Williamson J. said must be governmental in nature. For further discussion, see Kent McNeil,
“The Post-Delgamuukw Nature and Content of Aboriginal Title”, in McNeil, Emerging
Justice?, supra note 20 at 102 [McNeil, “Post-Delgamuukw”]; McNeil, “Judicial
Approaches”, supra note 32.
7

practices that the common law then translates into legal rights. 34 At the same
time, she disagreed explicitly with the territorial approach that had been taken by
Cromwell J.A. (as he then was) of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal and Daigle
J.A. of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal, favouring instead a site-specific
approach whereby Aboriginal title has to be established by proof of physical
occupation of specific sites (in this instance, where the Mi’kmaq accused had
harvested timber).
In their minority judgment, Justices LeBel and Fish disagreed forcibly with
McLachlin C.J.’s approach, which they thought relied too heavily on the
common law and did not take account of Indigenous law and Indigenous
conceptions of territory.35
I find McLachlin C.J.’s decision puzzling, in part because she concurred with
Lamer C.J. in Delgamuukw and thus seemed to endorse his acceptance of the
role of Indigenous law in proving occupation, which I have argued is necessarily
a territorial approach.36 She also purported to follow the Delgamuukw decision
in Marshall/Bernard. Moreover, in previous judgments she spoke of the
“golden thread” of continuity of Indigenous law from pre-contact times to the
present and said that Aboriginal rights that are sourced in Indigenous law
continue until either surrendered by treaty or extinguished by legislation.37
Unfortunately, Chief Justice McLachlin’s limited, common law approach and
her reliance on physical occupation have now been applied even more strictly by
the British Columbia Court of Appeal in the Tsilhqot’in Nation case. Moreover,
Justice Groberman, whose judgment was concurred in by Levine and Tysoe
JJ.A., adopted the site-specific approach used by McLachlin C.J. in
Marshall/Bernard, even though Justice Vickers at trial in Tsilhqot’in Nation had
pointed out that an Aboriginal title claim to a territory is different from a claim
to Aboriginal title to specific sites in the context of a defence to a prosecution, as
in Marshall/Bernard.38
34

For critical commentary, see “Special Forum: Perspectives on R. v. Marshall; R. v.
Bernard” (2006) 55 U.N.B.L.J. 73; Slattery, supra note 1 at 279-81.
35
Marshall/Bernard, supra note 2, esp. at paras. 110, 127-30. LeBel and Fish JJ. concurred
in result on the basis of the evidence, but disagreed with the majority on the correct approach
to proving Aboriginal title.
36
For critical discussion, see Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the Supreme Court: What’s
Happening?” (1996) 69 Sask. L. Rev. 281 [McNeil, “What’s Happening?”].
37
Van der Peet, supra note 18 at paras. 263-67; Mitchell at para. 10, quoted in note 19 supra.
38
See Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2008] 1 C.N.L.R. 112 at para. 582 [Tsilhqot’in
Nation BCSC]. On the inappropriateness of litigating Aboriginal title claims in the context of
8

Justice Groberman limited Aboriginal title to “definite tract[s] of land the
boundaries of which are reasonably capable of definition.”39 He regarded
definite tracts as “specific sites on which hunting, fishing, or resource extraction
activities took place on a regular and intensive basis”, such as “salt licks, narrow
defiles between mountains and cliffs, particular rocks or promontories used for
netting salmon, or, in other areas of the country, buffalo jumps”. 40 However, in
the numbered treaties, where vast areas of land were surrendered, the whole
treaty area was defined and referred to as a “tract”, revealing that the term
“definite tract” tells us nothing about the size of the area in question.41
Moreover, when Lamer C.J. stated in Delgamuukw that physical occupation
could be established by “regular use of definite tracts of land for hunting, fishing
or otherwise exploiting its resources”,42 he did not say that the use had to be
intensive – that qualification was added by Justice Groberman.43 Instead, Lamer
C.J. referred to the following passage from my book, Common Law Aboriginal
Title:
Definite tracts over which they [the Indigenous people in question]
herded domestic animals, and lands to which they resorted on a regular
basis to hunt, fish, or collect the natural products of the earth, should be
included [in the area occupied by them] as well, particularly if other
individuals and groups were generally excluded therefrom. Probably
even outlying areas that were visited occasionally, and regarded as
being under their exclusive control, would also be occupied by them in
prosecutions, see Marshall/Bernard, supra note 2 at paras. 142-44, per LeBel J.; Shin Imai,
“The Adjudication of Historical Evidence: A Comment and an Elaboration on a Proposal by
Justice LeBel” (2006) 55 U.N.B.L.J. 146.
39
Tsilhqot’in Nation BCCA, supra note 3 at para. 230.
40
Ibid. at para. 221.
41
E.g. see Treaty 3 (1873), in Alexander Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians
(Toronto: Belfords, Clarke & Co., 1880), 320 at 322: “The tract comprised within the lines
above described embracing an area of fifty-five thousand square miles”. Treaty 8 (1899),
covering an even larger area, provided that “the said Indians … shall have right to pursue
their usual vocations of hunting, trapping and fishing throughout the tract surrendered as
hereinbefore described”: Treaty No. 8, reprinted from the 1899 edition (Ottawa: Queen’s
Printer, 1966), 12.
42
Delgamuukw, supra note 6 at para. 149.
43
McLachlin C.J. did use the word “intensive” in Marshall/Bernard, supra note 2, but not as a
requirement. She stated at para. 70: “In summary, exclusive possession in the sense of
intention and capacity to control is required to establish aboriginal title. Typically, this is
established by showing regular occupancy or use of definite tracts of land for hunting, fishing
or exploiting resources: Delgamuukw, at para. 149. Less intensive uses may give rise to
different rights.”
9

much the same way as the waste of a manor would be occupied by the
lord, though he might seldom go there.44
As we shall see below, the common law standard for occupation that Lamer C.J.
found to be applicable in this context does not require intensive use, or indeed
any use at all in some circumstances – rather, what really counts is the intention
to possess and the exclusion of others.
My main criticisms of the British Columbia Court of Appeal decision in the
Tsilhqot’in Nation case are therefore twofold.45 First, even if one accepts (which
I do not46) that Aboriginal title depends exclusively on physical occupation of
definite tracts of land, the test for occupation applied by the British Columbia
Court of Appeal is inconsistent with common law authority relating to
occupation of land and is therefore too strict.47 My second criticism is that the
site-specific, non-territorial approach is simply wrong. It pays too much
attention to physical occupation and disregards Indigenous law. As discussed
above, this approach is inconsistent with the Delgamuukw decision.
5. The Common Law Standard for Occupation
I examined the common law requirements for occupation of land and related
them to proof of Aboriginal title in Common Law Aboriginal Title,48 and so will
only summarize the main points here. The case law reveals that occupation of
land is a question of fact that depends on all the circumstances. The nature of
the land and the uses to which it could reasonably be put at the relevant time
have to be taken into account. Lord O’Hagan put it this way in Lord Advocate v.
Lord Lovat:

44

McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 6 at 202 (footnote omitted).
For further criticism of the decision by a retired judge of the British Columbia Court of
Appeal, see Douglas Lambert, “The Tsilhqot’in Case” (2012) 70:6 The Advocate 819.
46
In Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 6, I presented Indigenous law title (ch. 6) and
common law title (ch. 7) as alternative approaches. In Delgamuukw, Lamer C.J. combined
these two approaches to produce the territorial approach described above. Thereafter, I
modified my own views to take into account the jurisdictional aspects of Aboriginal title: see
McNeil, “Post-Delgamuukw”, supra note 33; Kent McNeil, “Self-Government and the
Inalienability of Aboriginal Title” (2002) 47 McGill L.J. 473; McNeil, “What’s Happening?”,
supra note 36. See also Slattery, supra note 1.
47
See also Nicole Petersen, “The Standard of Occupation for Aboriginal Title in William v.
British Columbia”, April 2013, unpublished research paper.
48
Supra note 6 at 196-204.
45

10

The character and value of the property, the suitable and natural
mode of using it, the course of conduct which the proprietor might
reasonably be expected to follow with a due regard to his own
interests – all these things, greatly varying as they must, under
various conditions, are to be taken into account in determining the
sufficiency of a possession.49
A large variety of acts can therefore demonstrate occupation, including
perambulation,50 hunting,51 fishing,52 cutting grass,53 and even blazing trees.54 In
one case that went up on appeal from the British Columbia Court of Appeal to
the Privy Council in London, mere payment of taxes on wild, unimproved land
was held to be sufficient evidence of occupation to confer title.55 In another case
where the only act of occupation was placing markers at the four corners of the
land, the Privy Council found that to be sufficient. Lord Guest observed:
Their Lordships do not consider that in order to establish
possession it is necessary for a claimant to take some active step in
relation to the land such as enclosing the land or cultivating it. The
type of conduct which indicates possession must vary with the type
of land. In the case of vacant and unenclosed land which is not
being cultivated there is little which can be done on the land to
indicate possession.56
Moreover, in assessing the acts of occupation, “the conditions of life and habits
and ideas of the people” living there should be taken into account.57 The
relevant considerations are therefore social and cultural as well as physical.
49

(1880), 5 App. Cas. 273 at 288 (H.L.), approved in Johnston v. O’Neill, [1911] A.C. 552 at
583 (H.L.). See also the list of cases cited in McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra
note 6 at 200 n.27. Note that, while many of the authorities I am relying on are from the 19th
and early 20th centuries, this is appropriate because the time when the Tsilhqot’in have to
prove their occupation is 1846, the date at which Vickers J. held that the Crown had asserted
sovereignty over their territory: Tsilhqot’in Nation BCSC, supra note 38 at paras. 601-2.
50
Woolway v. Rowe (1834), 1 Ad. & E. 114 (K.B.).
51
Red House Farms Ltd. v. Catchpole (1976), 244 E.G. 295 (Engl. C.A.) [Red House Farms].
52
Curzon v. Lomax (1803), 5 Esp. 60 (K.B.); Bristow v. Cormican (1874), Ir. R. 10 C.L. 398
at 408 (Ex.), aff’d (1878), 3 App. Cas. 641 (H.L.).
53
Cadija Umma v. S. Don Manis Appu, [1939] A.C. 136 (P.C.) [Cadija Umma].
54
Halifax Power Co. v. Christie (1915), 48 N.S.R. 264 at 267 (N.S.S.C.) [Halifax Power].
55
Kirby v. Cowderoy, [1912] A.C. 599 at 602-3 [Kirby].
56
Wuta-Ofei v. Danquah, [1961] 1 W.L.R. 1238 at 1243 (P.C.) [Wuta-Ofei] (emphasis
added).
57
Cadija Umma (on appeal from Ceylon), supra note 53 at 141-42, per Sir George Rankin.
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At least as important as physical acts on or in relation to the land is the intention
to hold and use the land for one’s own purposes and to exclude others who have
not been given permission to enter.58 This is why placing markers or blazing
trees around the perimeter of the land demonstrate occupation, even if the land is
not otherwise occupied or used.59 In other words, the occupier is not obliged to
use the land in any particular way, as long as the intention to occupy is present
and manifest through public acts in relation to the land and no one else is in
actual occupation.60
In Marshall/Bernard, McLachlin C.J. held that, in assessing occupation in order
to determine whether Aboriginal title has been proven, a court has to decide
whether the Aboriginal relationship with the land was such that it could be
translated into title at common law.61 Relying on English case law,62 she
affirmed that “[t]he common law recognizes that possession sufficient to ground
title is a matter of fact, depending on all the circumstances, in particular the
nature of the land and the manner in which the land is commonly enjoyed”. 63
She noted as well that, “where marshy land is virtually useless except for
shooting, shooting over it may amount to adverse possession”, and “that a person
with adequate possession for title may use it intermittently or sporadically”. 64
Citing Delgamuukw, she also said that “the common law recognizes that
exclusivity does not preclude consensual arrangements that recognize shared
title to the same parcel of land”.65
Chief Justice McLachlin emphasized that assessment of the practices relied upon
to establish title must take into account the Aboriginal perspective:
The aboriginal perspective grounds the analysis and imbues its every
step. It must be considered in evaluating the practice at issue, and a
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generous approach must be taken in matching it to the appropriate
modern right.66
For example, she commented as follows on the requirement of exclusivity:
[T]he people may have been peaceful and have chosen to exercise
their control by sharing rather than exclusion. It is therefore critical
to view the question of exclusion from the aboriginal perspective….
It follows that evidence of acts of exclusion is not required to
establish aboriginal title. All that is required is demonstration of
effective control of the land by the group, from which a reasonable
inference can be drawn that it could have excluded others had it
chosen to do so.67
At common law, effective control can be demonstrated by regular use of the
land, but does not depend on use of specific sites. Indeed, the common law
cases clearly reveal that control of, or even notice of intention to control, the
perimeter of a tract of land is sufficient to establish occupation of all the land
within the perimeter.68
Most of the common law cases in which the issue of sufficiency of occupation
has arisen have involved adverse possession where a wrongdoer claimed to have
acquired a possessory title by ousting the rightful owner for the statutory
limitation period. Aboriginal peoples claiming Aboriginal title are obviously not
wrongdoers – on the contrary, they are claiming title because they were in
rightful occupation of their traditional lands at the time of Crown assertion of
sovereignty. The standard to be applied in determining whether they had the
occupation required for title should therefore be considerably lower than that
required for persons claiming title by adverse possession.69
However, in Tsilhqot’in Nation it is apparent that the British Columbia Court of
Appeal applied a standard higher even than the standard for adverse possession
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by wrongdoers. Without referring to a single case involving sufficiency of
occupation at common law, Groberman J.A. concluded that intensive and regular
use of definite tracts of land is necessary to establish the occupation required for
Aboriginal title. With all due respect, his test is inconsistent with the common
law standard, approved by McLachlin C.J. in Marshall/Bernard, which we have
seen is more concerned with intention to control and exclusion of others than
with specific use of the land, or indeed any use at all.70
Also missing from Groberman J.A.’s analysis is any serious assessment of the
Aboriginal perspective, which McLachlin C.J. said “grounds the analysis and
imbues its every step.”71 Judges should therefore be examining the evidence
carefully to determine what uses and what standard of occupation and exclusion
are appropriate to the specific Aboriginal society at the time in the geographical
location in question, taking into account, as Lamer C.J. directed in Delgamuukw
and McLachlin C.J. affirmed in Marshall/Bernard, “the group’s size, manner of
life, material resources, and technological abilities, and the character of the lands
claimed”.72 This approach is also in keeping with the common law, which
directs that “the conditions of life and habits and ideas of the people” need to be
taken into account.73
6. Conclusion: Applying Delgamuukw
In summary, the main problems I have identified with a strictly common law
approach to Aboriginal title are that it ignores Indigenous law and does not
include governmental authority. As a consequence, it does not take into account
the significant developments in the jurisprudence in the Delgamuukw and
Campbell decisions. Moreover, the British Columbia Court of Appeal decision
in Tsilhqot’in Nation, while purporting to take a common law approach, in fact
applied a test for Aboriginal occupation that is much stricter even than the
common law test for adverse possessors who are known wrongdoers. The
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standard of occupation applied by the Court of Appeal is therefore
discriminatory and must be rejected.
The Indigenous law approach, while acknowledging the existence and
continuing application of Indigenous law, suffers from serious shortcomings that
have become glaringly apparent in Australia: (1) in addition to showing a
connection with the land, Indigenous peoples in Australia have to prove they had
laws or customs that gave them rights in relation thereto prior to Crown
acquisition of sovereignty; (2) the content of their land rights is limited to the
rights under their pre-existing laws and customs; (3) they have no inherent
governmental authority that would permit them to make new laws or
significantly change their pre-existing laws; and (4) loss of their connection with
the land and discontinuance of their laws and customs in relation thereto result in
loss of their land rights.
In Delgamuukw, Chief Justice Lamer adopted the common law approach, but
went significantly beyond it by incorporating Indigenous law into the test for
establishing Aboriginal title. In so doing, he acknowledged the importance and
relevance of Indigenous law, while avoiding the problems with native title in
Australia by not relying on Indigenous law to define the content of Aboriginal
title. Instead, he maintained that Indigenous law is a source of Aboriginal title
that can be used to prove the occupation upon which the title depends. Given
that a society’s laws in relation to land are generally territorial in their
application,74 Lamer C.J.’s conception of Aboriginal title is necessarily
territorial. Moreover, as held by Justice Williamson in the Campbell decision,
Aboriginal title as conceptualized by Lamer C.J. includes governmental
authority. Unlike Aboriginal title under a strictly common law approach, it is
more than a proprietary interest. It is also jurisdictional.
Chief Justice Lamer’s approach to Aboriginal title is an innovative advance in
the jurisprudence that was concurred in by the current Chief Justice. It resolves
the dilemma of having to choose between the common law and Indigenous law
as the source of Aboriginal title. At the same time, it can be used to explain the
distinction between the external and internal aspects of Indigenous title,
identified by Brian Slattery.75 Externally, as against the outside world,
Aboriginal title is a generic right that, subject to the limit that the lands cannot be
74
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used in ways irreconcilable with the connection with the land on which the title
is based,76 does not vary from one title-holding group to another. Internally, the
Indigenous law of each group continues to apply to govern landholding within
their territory. Moreover, this law is not frozen in time at the moment of Crown
assertion of sovereignty. It is dynamic, and can be modified at any time through
the exercise of the group’s right of internal self-government.77
We have seen that the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s decision in the
Tsilhqot’in Nation case deviated substantially from both the common law
standard for occupation of land and the Delgamuukw decision on the role
Indigenous law in proving Aboriginal title. In January, 2013, the Supreme Court
of Canada granted leave to appeal. The appeal is scheduled to be heard on
November 7 of this year. With all due respect, I think the Supreme Court should
overturn Justice Groberman’s decision and apply the combined common
law/Indigenous law approach to proof of Aboriginal title that was firmly
established by the Court’s own decision in Delgamuukw.
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